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1
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The interpretation of the following Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is determinative of certain issues in this appeal:
Rule 15 provides in pertinent part:
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires.
Rule 23 is set forth in the addendum at the end of this
Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs are holders of preferred stock in defendant
Insurance Investment Company ("II").

II holds most of the voting

stock of the defendant Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Company
("Equitable").

These companies and their principal officers,

R. Earl Ross ("Earl") and E. Roderick Ross ("Rod")f are all jointly
referred to as the "Equitable defendants", and sometimes herein as
"defendants".
Plaintiff Leontine C. Pond ("Pond")f and later plaintiff
Merle G. Hyer Company ("Hyer"), have sought to represent a class
comprised of all holders of II preferred stock, except for Earl,
Rod, and their relatives ("the Ross family").

The trial court

declined to certify this plaintiff class.
Thereafter, other members of this plaintiff class sought
to intervene.

Their petition to intervene was denied.

They did

not appeal that denial. Therefore, defendants1 statement on page
38 of their Brief that Judge Sawaya did not abuse his discretion
when he denied the motion to allow intervention of additional
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preferred shareholders is not addressed herein, because it is
immaterial.
In their statement of the case, defendants emphasize on
page 4 of their Brief that the facts forming the basis of their
second motion for summary judgment were not disputed by contradictory
evidence, and proceed to list those facts.
However, those undisputed facts likewise do not contradict
the facts set forth in the plaintiffs1 Brief.
For ease of reference, some of the numbered facts found
in the Statement of the Case in the plaintiffs' opening Brief are
essentially duplicated here:
1.

Pond was issued her 500 shares of II preferred stock

after the death of her husband, Stillman H. Pond, upon the cancellation
of the certificates that had been issued to him when he purchased
them during their marriage in the early 1940's. ROA at 3.
2.

In the early 1980!s, only members of the Ross family

would purchase Equitable or II preferred stock, and then only for
less than $5 per share.

Deposition of Rod taken June 10, 1991 -

ROA at 759, 549 (Rod Depo) at 120-21.

Deposition of Earl taken

June 11, 1991 - ROA at 760, 549 (Earl Depo) at 67-71.
3.

As of October 31, 1986, the Ross family owned or

controlled all or nearly all of the voting common stock of II and
about 70% of the II preferred stock.
4.

ROA at 475-78.

A threat to Earl and Rod's control of Equitable was

finally eliminated by Equitable's secret purchase of all of the II
common and preferred stock and Equitable stock held directly or
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indirectly by defendants Galen Ross, Connie Ross, David Ross and
Betsy Ross Rapps, the members of the Ross family who had been
pushed from a position of control. ROA at 437, 476-78.
5.

This was paid in the form of cash and a new issue

of Equitable preferred stock, with the latter likely to be redeemed
over a period of about 10 years.
6.

ROA at 422-30.

The 1988 Annual Statement reported that in the

purchase of its own stock pursuant to the 1986 offer, and in the
purchase from "a coalition," Equitable paid a total consideration
of $6,809,596 for the equivalent of 300,609 of its own shares, or
an average of $22.65 per share.

As part of this purchase, Equitable

bought over 40% (based on liquidation rights) of the outstanding
II stock.

Rod Depo, Exh. 1, 4th page, included in the Addendum hereto.
7.

That same 1988 Annual Statement reported that each

share it held of II stock, both common and preferred, was equivalent
to 3.717 shares of its own stock "(based on liquidation rights)."
Id.

Thus those same liquidation rights would result in an average

value of over $84 per share of II stock, common or preferred.
8.

When equitable made that secret purchase of stock,

including II preferred stock, from the said "coalition" of insiders,
it made no comparable offer to purchase the II preferred stock
held by the plaintiff class, which would have meant an additional
investment of less than $1,730,000. ROA at 11, 43.
9.

Dividends have been declared or paid by II in only

a very few years since the issuance of the preferred stock therein,
and then only at the minimum rate, 6% of the $1 par value.

II has
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indicated that dividends have been paid to the preferred shareholders
of II on four occasions, namely/ in 1954, 1981, 1983 and 1984, and
seven times total.

ROA 211-12, 500.
ARGUMENT

1.

THE PLAINTIFF CLASS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED UNDER

RULE 23(B) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WHERE THE PROPOSED
CLASS CONSISTS OF 105 HOLDERS OF PREFERRED STOCK HAVING CLAIMS
BASED ON FACTS SUCH AS THE COMPANY FAILING TO PAY DIVIDENDS, AND
CERTAIN INSIDERS SELLING ALL OF THEIR PREFERRED STOCK TO A CONTROLLED
COMPANY AT A PRICE PER SHARE OVER 16 TIMES AS GREAT AS THE MEMBERS
OF THE PROPOSED CLASS COULD OBTAIN.
The class is numerous enough.
Defendants have not referred the court to any case
showing that a class size of 105 preferred shareholders fails to
satisfy the first requirement of Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure that the class be so numerous that joinder of all
members is impractical.

Rather, they say that after solicitation,

only 10 demonstrated any interest, a number which did not make
joinder impractical.

Defendants1 Brief at 15, 19-20.

In response, many of the addresses on the records of II
shareholders are incorrect.

This is not surprising in view of how

seldom II sends a dividend or any other communication to those
shareholders.
Over twenty envelopes were returned with no indication
of the correct address.

On a couple there was the additional

note that the addressees were deceased.

In nearly all cases there
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has not been a follow-up to determine if the other addressees ever
received the initial correspondence.

ROA at 585.

Some of the addressees have responded by stating that
they sold their holdings. Others indicated they were relatives of
the addresseesf now deceased, and they did not know where a certificate
was or if the addressees still held the stock at the time of their
death.

Id.
Only two preferred shareholders stated they had decided

not to intervene.

One holds 1,000 shares and is apparently the

wife of Mark Jensen, a man who
was a stockbroker at the time that Bennett
Leasing attempted a hostile takeover of Equitable,
and got wind of it through inside information,
and went about to attempt to purchase as much
stck as he possibly could from a lot of
shareholders of Equitable Life & Casualty
Company at as low a cost as he could so that
he could, therefore, thereafter make a killing
by selling said stock to Bennett Leasing.
Rod Depo. at 67.
In her case, it would appear that she would prefer to
let others pay the costs and attorneys' fees of this litigation
and then come forward to demand equal treatment.
In the other case, an apparently retired couple mailed a
letter (ROA at 592 and included in the Addendum hereto), and then
decided they would just as soon hang onto their 175 shares.
So the fact that relatively few applied to intervene
does not prove a class action is unwarranted.

If anything, it

shows an additional need for certification of the class.
The member's desire to join is not an element of typicality.
Defendants have argued that the proposed class
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representatives are not typical, because they have not shown that
other members of the proposed class "feel aggrieved" or "had a
complaint."

Defendants1 Brief at 20-21.

The cited case of White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412
(1971) found a lack of typicality because the plaintiff had not
yet shown that other minority employees who had been discharged by
defendant felt that they were discharged by reason of their race
or color.
Defendants' confusion evidently arose from the following
sentence paraphrased in defendants1 Brief:

"It seems apparent

that a claim cannot be typical of the claims of a class if no
other member of the class feels aggrieved."

Id. at 415.

However, the context of the case clearly shows that the
ruling was not based merely on the lack of proof of a subjective
desire for redress on the part of other members of the class.
Rather, the court was concerned that no other member of the class,
when asked, would know of evidence or otherwise feel that his
discharge was not based on legitimate grounds.
After the statement quoted above, the White opinion
explained "we are of the opinion that [typicality] requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that other members of the class he purports
to represent have suffered the same grievances of which he complains."
Id.
The case of Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263
(10th Cir. 1975) cited by defendants, which case also cited the
White case, supports this interpretation/
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In the Taylor casef the plaintiff showed the existence
of discriminatory employment practices by Safeway in the frozen
food warehouse.

He evidently could not find many others in the

class, if any, that had suffered any legally cognizable damage as
a result of such practices.
In citing White, the Taylor opinion stated that the
concern in White was whether there was in fact a class needing
representation.

Taylor indicated that the question was not whether

every employee would have the same fact situation.

That would be

unnecessary for the maintenance of a class action.

Rather, the

question was whether anyone else had a legitimate claim.

Unless

that had to be shown, the trial court would unrealistically have
"to compare the claims and defenses of the plaintiff with the
hypothetical claims of a hypothetical class."
Clearly the instant cases suffers no such infirmity.
Every other member of the class suffered the same legally cognizable
harm as the representative plaintiff, differing only in the amount,
dependent upon the number of preferred shares owned.

It is not

a prerequisite to show that other members care about receiving the
legal and equitable remedies to which they are entitled.
Even if defendants1 interpretation is correct that the
other members of the class must be desirous that their rights be
pursued, this can be presumed under the facts of this case.
II issued and sold its preferred stock over 45 years ago.

Although

holders if this stock were to be the first to receive dividends,
they have received dividends only seven times, because in only
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seven years have dividends been declared.

Although the funds they

provided have been successfully invested and the value of the
company is very highf only the holders of common shares can and do
benefit from that value.

Although members of the plaintiff class

were to share at least pro-rata in any dissolution or liquidation
of the company, insiders holding about one-third of the ownership
of the company, much in the form of preferred shares, have been
able to receive essentially the liquidation value of their shares
of the company, while others selling preferred stock must settle
for less than one-sixteenth of that value.

Under these facts, the

class would clearly exist even if to exist the members had to
desire enforcement of their rights.
2.

WHERE OVER ONE-THIRD (BASED ON LIQUIDATION RIGHTS)

OF THE STOCK IN A HOLDING COMPANY IS PURCHASED BY THE COMPANY IT
CONTROLS, THERE HAS BEEN "ANY LIQUIDATION" UNDER ITS 1944 AMENDED
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, ENTITLING ITS SHAREHOLDERS TO BE PAID IN
THE MANNER PRESCRIBED THEREIN.
"Any liquidation" does not mean only "complete liquidation".
The Articles of Incorporation of II, as amended July 17,
1944, stated in paragraph B. of Article VII:
In the event of any liquidation, dissolution
or winding up of this corporation, the holders
of Preferred Stock shall be entitled to be
paid in full the par value thereof before any
amount shall be paid or any assets' distributed
to the holders of Common Stock Class "A" and
after the payment to the holders of Common
Stock Class "A" of an amount equal to the par
value of said Common Stock Class "A" the
remaining assets of this corporation shall be
divided and paid to the holders of Preferred
Stock and the Holders of Common Stock Class
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"A" according to the number of their respective
shares. ROA at 9, 10, 42. [Emphasis added.]
The defendants have argued that "liquidation" can refer
only to a complete winding up of II's business, thus deleting the
emphasized "any" and changing the emphasized "or" to "and."
However, that definition of liquidation is much too narrow.
As a matter of fact, the defendants in their Brief do
not confine their use of the term liquidation to such a narrow
meaning.

On page 30 of that Brief, they state, "Donahue and the

other cases cited by plaintiffs all relate to a preferential
liquidation or minority shareholder 'freeze out,' ...."

But each

case cited referred to a situation, such as the instant matter, where
those in control used corporate assets to buy a large block of
stock from insiders without making a similar offer to all shareholders.
Liquidation is the opposite of capitalization, and involves
a return of capital.
By "partial liquidations" we understand to be
meant proceedings involving the surrender by
the corporation of portions of its capital.
Smith v. Dana, 60 A. 117, 123 (Conn. 1905).
In the Smith case, the issue was whether a trust holding
the corporation's stock should treat an extraordinary dividend as
income or principal.

This was also the issue in the case of In re

Sears' Will, 26 N.Y.S.2d 912 (N.Y. Surr. 1941), wherein the dividends
were ruled liquidating dividends and ordered distributed to the
remaindermen of the trust.
In the case of Jay Ronald Co. v. Marshall Mortgage Corp.,
40 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Sup. 1943), the corporation had reduced its
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capital by $200,000.

The court ruled that the corporation had to

distribute these funds to its stockholders.
was awarded.

However, no interest

"We are of the opinion that the stockholders are not

entitled thereto since a reduction of capital is in effect a
voluntary liquidation of the retired capital .. . ."

3j3. at 399.

In none of these cases did the corporation dissolve and
wind up its business.

And in each case the court did not define and

refer to liquidation as requiring that finality or intent.
3.

A CONTROLLED COMPANY AND ITS OFFICERS AND SHAREHOLDERS

ARE NOT INSULATED BY ARTIFICIALITIES FROM ANY FIDUCIARY DUTY TO
THE SHAREHOLDERS OF ITS HOLDING COMPANY.
Defendants argue that assuming plaintiffs would have a
cause of action for actions of Equitable if they were shareholders
of Equitable, their cause of action fails because they are only
shareholders of II, a company which controls but is not identical
to Equitable.
It is true that the corporate legal fiction arising with
the establishment of holding company is not always disregarded as
a matter of course.

But it is not true that this fiction forms

an immutable wall against redress that is otherwise appropriate.
The case of Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors,
761 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 1988) considered the responsibility of a
parent corporation for the actions of a subsidiary, and reviewed
Utah law pertaining to disregarding the corporate entity.
In that case, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the
summary judgment dismissing the parent corporation in an action
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against the subsidiary where it was alleged the parent owned 100%
of the subsidiary's stock; the parent financed the subsidiary and
paid some of its debts - without formal documentation and with no
particular requirements for repayment; the subsidiary was
undercapitalized; and the subsidiary's directors and officers did
not act independently of the parent.

Id^. at 47.

The ooinion in that case cited the case of Norman v. Murray
First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979) and referred to
the two-prong test adopted therein to determine when disregarding
the corporate entity is justified.
The opinion then referred to the fact that Messick
v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 678 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1984) had
called the first prong of this two-prong test found in Norman the
"formalities requirement."

The Messick opinion referred to the

formalities required by statute, including record keeping, shareholders' meetings, adequate capitalization, stock issuance, etc.
Apparently the record has not yet been developed enough
to show the complete picture as to the observation of formalities.
However, the record does show that on or about March 21, 1989 a
request was made for financial information of II, and the response
lacked detail, consisting of two pages, a Balance Sheet and a
Statement of Profit & Loss, copies of which are included in the
Addendum hereto.

ROA at 6, 15, 16, 38.

The Salt Lake City ooinion stated:
In the parent-subsidiary situation, the central
focus of the formalities prong is "the degree
of control that the parent exercises over the
subsidiary and the extent to which the corporate
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formalities of the subsidiary are observed."
Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 Willamette
L. Rev. at 397. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James
Constructors , supra, 761 P.2d at 47.
The opinion then referred with approval to the eleven
factors listed on page 398 of the Willamette article relevant to
deciding whether the parent exercises "the necessary control" over
its subsidiary.

Some of these eleven factors are as follows:

(1) the parent corporation owns all or most
of the capital stock of the subsidiary;
(2) the parent and subsidiary corporations
employ common directors or officers;
(3) the parent corporation finances the
subsidiary;
(4) the parent corporation subscribes to all
the capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise
causes its incorporation;
(5) the subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital;
(8) in the papers of the parent corporation
or in the statement of its officers, the
subsidiary is described as a department or
division of the parent corporation, or its
business or financial responsibility is referred
to as the parent corporation's own;
(9) the directors or executives of the subsidiary
do not act independently in the interest of
the subsidiary but take their orders from the
parent corporation in the latter's interest;
(11) the parent corporation uses the property
of the subsidiary as its own.
Usually, the parent-subsidiary relationship is devised
to shield the assets of the parent from outside parties. However,
in the instant case, the purpose is to try to keep the assets in
the subsidiary further removed from the minority shareholders of
the parent.

Hence a number of the factors enumerated above, as

well as those omitted, would be reversed, but still show the
applicability of the instrumentality rule.
For example as to the 8th factor, the subsidiary Equitable
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shows its holdings of II stock, both common and preferredf as
treasury stock, valuing them according to an II liquidation.

Rod

Depo, Exh. 1, 4th page, included in the Addendum hereto.
Page 47 of the Salt Lake City opinion then referred to
the second prong of the Norman test as the "fairness requirement,"
which, as indicated on page 794 of the Messick case, "is addressed
to the conscience of the court."
The defendants cite W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law
of Private Corporations, (perm. ed. 1984) for support against
ignoring any aspect of the separate corporate existence of II and
Equitable.

Defendants' Brief at 29. However, that reference also

shows that the corporate veils of parents and subsidiaries can be
pierced in a number of circumstances, based on instrumentality,
alter ego, and agency, in the presence of bad faith, or some other
improper conduct.
4.

Id.. Sec. 43 at 72 9.

A CORPORATION IS NOT JUSTIFIED IN SECRETLY PURCHASING

ALL OF CERTAIN INSIDERS' PREFERRED STOCK OF ITS HOLDING COMPANY,
AT A PRICE PER SHARE OVER 16 TIMES AS GREAT AS THE PRICE THE OTHER
HOLDERS OF THAT STOCK COULD OBTAIN FROM THE CORPORATION OR ANYONE
ELSE, ESPECIALLY IN ORDER TO RESOLVE DISPUTES OVER A CORPORATION'S
CONTROL, DESPITE THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE..
Equitable should have offered to buy plaintiffs' II preferred shares.
Equitable should have offered to buy plaintiffs' II
preferred shares at the same price and on the same terms as those
applicable to its purchase of II preferred shares from the defendants
Galen J. Ross, David E. Ross II, Betsy Ross Rapps, and Connie Ross.
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Defendants argue that this would require Equitable to
offer to buy out its own shareholders.
n. 8.

Appellee's Brief at 30

However, Equitable already offered to buy out its own

shareholders for $22.50 per share of Equitable, which was a fair
price.

Rod Depof Exh. 1, 4th pager included in the Addendum hereto.
On page 30 of their Brief, defendants cite three cases as

support for their statement that Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of
New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975) does not represent
the law in Utah.

Actually, all three cases fail to mention Donahue

or its principles:

Lochhead v. Alacano, 697 F. Supp. 406 (D. Utah

1988) held that the minority shareholders had stated an individual
cause of action rather than derivative when their holdings had been
diluted; Nash v. Craigco, 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978) held that
punitive damages were available where a person obtained an option
for shares that were subsequently diluted; and In re Black, 787 F.2d
503, 506 (10th Cir. 1986) ruled that an officer who embezzled
corporate funds had breached his duty to the corporation rather
than to an individual stockholder.
On that same page 30, defendants state that Donahue
represents a rule that has been soundly rejected.

Actually, only

a per se rule, one that would require a corporation to give all
shareholders an equal opportunity to sell their stock in every
case, has been rejected.

And the cases cited by defendants,

Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259, 1264 (4th Cir. 1978) (which
distinguished Donahue) and McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547
(10th Cir. 1969) (which predated Donahue), did not deal with the
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purchase by a corporation of its own stock, but rather the sale of
a controlling block of stock to an outsider.
In reality, Donahue has withstood the test of timef though
its principles have been "refined."

Crowley v. Communications for

Hospitals, 573 N.E.2d 996, 1001 (Mass. App. 1991).
The Crowley case pointed out that the controlling group
must be given an opportunity to "demonstrate a legitimate business
purpose for its actions."

Id..

However, the Crowley case did not

need to decide the extent to which the refinement applied, because
in that case, as in the instant matter:
There is manifest unfairness to the excluded,
nonconsenting minority interests for the majority,
year after year, to appropriate to themselves
substantially all of the net income of the
enterprise, and such an operational policy,
which deprives the company, and therefore its
stockholders, of all opportunites for growth
in net worth, serves no legitimate business
purpose. Id.
Defendants distinguish Donahue on the basis that control
was not at issue in that case.

However, control was the issue in

the case of Comolli v. Comolli, 246 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. 1978).
In that case, two brothers, Louis and Mario, joined
forces to oust the oldest brother, Felix, from his positions as
president and general manager of their company.

When Mario died,

his widow Christine would not sell Mario's stock to Felix for $800
per share, but she would sell it to the other brother Louis for
that price.

Louis bought 10 shares personally, and ran out of money.

So he used his control to have the corporation buy the rest. Thus
the corporate assets were used to prevent the risk of a sale of
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stock to Felix and the accompanying change of control.
The court stated that in Georgia directors have a duty
to act in good faith and with ordinary diligence.

This good faith

does not just apply to the corporation, but "also requires that
stockholders be treated fairly and that their investments be
protected,"

^d. at 280.

The court pointed out that minority stockholders in
close corporations may have relative insignificance and their
investments be held captive.

But this should not be aided or

reinforced by the use of corporate funds.

Ld. at 281.

The action of the directors demonstrated a lack of good
faith, since the funds used to purchase the shares from Christine
were not then available for dividends.

"[G]ood faith requirefd] the

directors to authorize a corporate purchase of Felix1 stock at
the same price and the same terms given to Christine," if there
were to be any corporate purchase at all. Id.
The court then cited Donahue, supra, and added that such
a course of action would eliminate any question of a preferential
distribution of assets and provide Felix with an opportunity to
liquidate his investment.

Id.

The defendants cited the case of Delahoussaye^ v. Newhard,
785 S.W.2d 609 (Mo, App. 1990) as a counter-example.

However,

that opinion distinguished the Donahue case on its facts, pointing
out that in Donahue the directors who discriminated in their
purchase of stock with corporate funds were a "controlling group,"
owning or controlling a majority of the stock issued and outstanding.
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In Delahoussaye the directors who approved the stock purchase did
not own or control a majority of the outstanding shares.
At the time Equitable selectively purchased stock of its
holding company, the named defendants controlled II and Equitable,
Not only that, but the named defendants, excluding the selling
defendants, controlled II and Equitable; although in view of the
litigation, that control was tenuous. They had gained this control
by means of the sale of some pivotal II stock from a charitable
foundation to a person friendly to their position.

Earl Depo at 12.

Defendants are not excused by the business judgment rule.
The defendants cite Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946 (Del. Supr. 1985) to show that their actions were
justified by the business judgment rule.

That case involved a

decision by the directors, a majority of whom were outsiders.
After hours of deliberations, some involving only the outside
directors, the board unanimously agreed to offer to buy the company's
stock from any stockholder except the party engaged in a hostile
takeover attempt.

Thus the business judgment rule and presumption

described in Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Supr. 1984)
of action having been taken in good faith would apply.
But even that presumption of adequate justification
would be overcome upon a showing that the directors "acted out of
a sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in office."
Unocal, supra, 493 A.2d at 954.
Not only can the presumption be overcome, but where a
threat to control is involved, the burden shifts to the directors
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to show that the purchase of stock is primarily in the corporate
interest.

Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964).
In the Cheff case, cited by defendants, the appellate

court found that the directors carried that burden.

The directors

had adduced evidence showing that their motivation for the use of
corporate assets to selectively purchase stock was a valid business
purpose.

To reach this result, the appellate court reversed two

findings of fact, finding instead that all evidence demonstrated
that there was a real threat the company would be liquidated and
that this threat had caused employee unrest.
In the instant matter, insiders and major stockholders
controlled the decision.

Control was clearly involved.

Hence the

burden to show a valid business purpose is on the defendants.
They have shown no threat of liquidation.

And it cannot otherwise

be said that as a matter of law they have carried their burden to
show that the primary purpose was a valid business purpose, rather
than to maintain control.
The defendants1 argument that control was not involved
in purchasing II preferred stock is flawed.

The purchase of II

preferred stock enabled the purchase of II common stock, which involved
control.

Whether this control was threatened by Bennett Leasing

or by other members of the Ross family is irrlevant.
5.

EVERY ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY OF THE

OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF A CORPORATION NEED NOT BE BROUGHT AS A
DERIVATIVE ACTION.
Defendants argue that any claim against them belongs to
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II or Equitable, and can therefore only be brought as a derivative
action.

Appellee's Brief at 34-35.
This distinction was discussed in detail in the case of

Crowley v. Communications for Hospitals, 573 N.E.2d 996 (Mass.
App. 1991).

That case stated:

A finding of a "freeze-out" scheme may well be
an element of a case for direct relief, but it
is not necessarily sufficent to preclude the
need for derivative relief. Id_. at 1004.
Wording this another way, while facts such as excessive
officer salaries may provide the basis for an action which is
necessarily derivative, they can still also support elements of a
case for direct relief on the basis of a "freeze-out" scheme.
In footnotes, the Crowley opinion pointed out that the
transaction complained of in the Donahue case was fair as between
the corporation and the sellers of the stock.

Thus that did not

show a violation of fiduciary duty to the corporation and justify
a recovery by the corporation.

Id^., nn. 15-17.

Likewise in the instant matter, the stock purchase
was fair as to the corporation.

But it served to further ensure

that the minority stockholders would be frozen out.
6.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED AGAINST THE OFFICERS

AND DIRECTORS FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY WHEN ONLY EQUITABLE
RELIEF INVOLVING THE COMPANY, AND NO GENERAL OR COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES FROM THE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, IS SPECIFIED IN THE PRAYER.
Equitable relief suffices.
Defendants cite the case of Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain
States Tel., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985) as if it overruled the case
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of Nash v, Craiqcoy 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978).

However the Atkin

opinion did not address Nash because the situations were so different.
In Nash only equitable relief was granted.
punitive damages were awarded.

Nevertheless

"Whether a party gets relief in

equity or as a substitute therefor gets money ought not make a
difference."

IA.

at 777.

In Atkin no equitable relief had been sought.

The

Supreme Court firSt vacated the award of monetary damages and then
the award of punitive damages.

The Nash case was never mentioned.

The prayer need not be specific.
Since plaintiffs will not prevail by default, they are
not limited by the prayers of the complaints.

Thus nominal damagesf

general damages, compensatory damages, etc. may be awarded.
The argument that such relief may be an afterthought or
unexpected does not remove the possibility of its being granted.
In a close corporation, however, a minority
shareholder who merely receives an offer from
a majority shareholder to sell stock at an
inadequate price, but does not accept that
offer, can still seek damages if_ the shareholder
can prove that the offer was part of a plan to
freeze the minority shareholder out of the
corporation. Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d
3, 8 (1st Cir. 1986).
7.

PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINTS

TO ADD A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT WHEN THE CASE
WAS STILL IN THE DISCOVERY AND MOTION STAGE.
Claims previously denied can be reiterated.
Defendants state that plaintiffs' Motion to Allow Amended
Complaint was denied after their other claims were all dismissed.
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However, the Motion was filed well over a month before the trial
court heard argument and decided to dismiss those other claims.
ROA at 525, 593, 595.
The fact that the Amended Complaint included all claims,
and not just those based on oppressive conduct, did not justify
the refusal to allow it.

It could easily have been allowed subject

to the decisions made with respect to claims in the original
complaints.
Disallowance of amendment could cause deprivation of claims.
Although the overall standard of review applicable to
this issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion,
Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984), it would seem clear
that this should resolve into a question of law as to whether the
claims added in the proposed Amended Complaint (ROA at 529), and
particularly those pertaining to oppressive conduct (ROA at 544),
stated a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that when a party seeks to amend his pleading, "leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires." This needs to be more than
just an ineffective platitude.
The facts showing oppressive conduct are in large measure
the facts supporting plaintiffs1 other claims.

Thus plaintiffs

must pursue the oppressive conduct claims in this action or be
forever barred.

Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873

(Utah 1983).
So if a cause of action has been stated for oppressive
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conduct, and it is barred forever because it was not initially
stated in the complaints (although the pertinent facts were pled),
then form is certainly being exalted over substance.

This is

particularly true if no other cause of action has been stated
based upon those facts and plaintiffs can obtain no relief whatsover.
What the defendants have done to the outsiders who
invested in II preferred stock, many of whom have held that stock
over 45 years and are now widows and widowers, is shocking to the
conscience.

At least as shocking would be a ruling that the

plaintiffs are barred forever based on a procedural matter such as
this, that is, a delay in fully describing their cause of action
until the motion and discovery stage.
Claims exist on the basis of oppressive conduct.
Shareholders have a statutory cause of action when the
acts of the directors or those in control are oppressive.

Utah

Code Subsec. 16-10-92(a )(2 ) or, since 1992, 16-10a-1430(2)(b).
Defendants have argued that they have done only what
they had a right to do.

For example, they cite Donahue for the

proposition that they do not have to answer to the courts for
their decisions as to dividends.

Appellees1 Brief at 40-41.

The excerpt from Donahue cited by the defendants is part
of the material supporting the statement in that case that "the
corporate form ... supplies an opportunity for the majority stockholders to oppress or disadvantage minority stockholders."

Donahue

v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513
(Mass. 1975).

Donahue pointed out that, as a practical matter, it
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is hard to prove a violation of fiduciary duty just because dividends
are not declared.
Again looking at factual matters individually, the
defendants state that excessive officer salaries are only relevant
to derivative actions.

Appellees' Brief at 41.

However, the plundering of a corporation by means of
excessive salaries often constitutes "oppressive" conduct:
Thus, an abuse of corporate position for
private gain at the expense of the stockholders
is "oppressive" conduct. Or the plundering of
a "close" corporation by the siphoning off of
profits by excessive salaries or bonus payments
and the operation of the business for the sole
benefit of the majority of the stockholders,
to the deteriment of the minority stockholders,
would constitute such "oppressive" conduct as
to authorize a dissolution of the corporation
under the terms of ORS 57.595. Baker v. Commercial
Body Builders, Inc., 264 Ore. 614, 507 P.2d
387, 394 (1973).
Generally, oppressive conduct involves a pattern of
activities which are markedly unfair, violate the fiduciary
responsibility of the majority shareholders, or thwart the reasonable
expectations of the minority shareholders:
Oppressive conduct suggests "burdensome, harsh
and wrongful conduct, a lack of probity and
fair dealing in the affairs of a company to
the prejudice of some of its members, or a
visible departure from the standards of fair
dealings and a violation of fair play on which
every shareholder who entrusts his money to a
company is entitled to rely." Whale Art Co.,
Inc. v. Doctor, 743 S.W.2d 511, 514
(Mo. App. 1987).
Thus, we conclude that our cases involving
the fiduciary duty owed by majority shareholders,
officers and directors of a corporation embrace
the same standard which other courts have
evolved under the term "oppressive conduct."
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Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 440
(W.Va. 1980).
The [New York] court stated that "oppression
should be deemed to arise only when the majority
conduct substantially defeats expectations
that, objectively viewed, were both reasonable
under the circumstances and were central to
the petitioner's decision to join the venture,"
Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387
(N.D. 1987).
The case of Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P. 2d 929
(Mont. 1982) reviewed these definitions and applied them to show
oppression where dividends had not been declared:
It can be said here that the corporations
are in a position to declare dividends, that
the refusal to do so acts as a hardship on
Melvin, and when considered in light of all
other circumstances, that such refusal strengthens
Melvin's argument that he is being squeezed.
This is a case where the cumulative effects
of many acts and incidents constitute sufficient
evidence of oppressive conduct to compel
liquidation without a showing of inevitable
ruin. Jd. at 934.
Although dissolution was found to be the appropriate
remedy in the Fox case, a "buy-out" has often been found to be the
appropriate remedy for oppressive conduct, even in the absence of
express statutory or contractual authority.

See Davis v. Sheerin,

754 S.W.2d 375, 379 (Tex. App. 1988) and the cases cited therein.
In the instant matter, obviously there has been the
financial ability to pay dividends.

It can hardly be said, and

certainly not as a matter of law, that outsiders reasonably would
have been purchased II preferred stock over 45 years ago at $1 per
share with the expectation that despite a successful and robust
venture, they would be limited to receiving $.06 seven times over
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that period, and have nothing for retirement.
CONCLUSION
The trial court should have certified the plaintiff
class under Rule 23(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedurer since
the class was numerous enough and no subjective desire is necessary.
The trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that
there was not "any liquidation" as that term was used in the
Amended Articles of Incorporationf and thus that there was no
requirement to evenly allocate the funds paid to the II shareholders.
The existence of a holding company does not shield the
wrongful conduct of the common directors. Those directors cannot
cause the subsidiary to expend a huge amount of corporate assets to
buy out only certain holders of the parent's stock where their
purpose was to maintain control.
Where there has been discrimination against certain
shareholdersf these shareholders have a cause of action which is
not just derivative.

They also have a cause of action for punitive

damages against all involved in a breach of fiduciary duty even
though their main remedy sought may be equitable.
The shareholders had a right to amend their complaint by
adding a cause based on oppressive conduct, since they did indeed
state a cause of action on that basis.
DATED this Z C ~ day of

^7^-^^

_, 1993.

LYNN P. HEWARD & DELWIN T. POND
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants

LYNN P. HEWARD
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South State Street #1200, P.O. Box 510210, Salt Lake City, Utah
84151 on this
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ADDENDUM
Rule 23 provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a class action.

One or more members of a

class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
(b) Class action maintainable.

An action may be maintained as

a class action if the prerequisites of Subdivision (a) are satisfied,
and in addition:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect
to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
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(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.

The matters pertinent to the

findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
(c) Determination by order whether class action to be maintained;
notice; judgment; actions conducted partially as class actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be maintained.

An order under this subdivision

may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision
on the merits.
(2)

In any class action maintained under Subdivision (b)(3),

the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice
to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.

The

notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude
him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the
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judgmentr whether favorable or notr will include all members who
do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request
exclusion mayf if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under Subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds
to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained
as a class action under Subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable
to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom
the notice provided in Subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who
have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be
members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained
as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class
may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a
class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and
applied accordingly.

A. The Company i s controlled by Insurance Investment Company, a uian corper«n*m g -...-..
...
Investment has two classes of stock. There are 25,000 shares, voting stock and 77,177.5 shares of ft noncumulative, nonvoting, $1.00 par value of preferred stock, femersnip
and control of this voting stock i s described in Schedule Y, Organizational Chart.
6. The Company owns 11.502.23 voting-shares and 25,050 preferred shares of Insurance Investment Corporation.
C. During 1986, the Board of Directors of Equitable l i f e and Casualty Insurance Company (hereafter the "Company") determined that i t would be in i t s best interest
to purchase some of the Company's outstanding common stock and the common and preferred stock of Insurance Investment Company, the Company's parent corporation. The
Utah Department of Insurance was notified of this intent and gave i t s consent to the same where necessary. The stock purchase program would s a t i s f y any or all of the following
purposes:
(1) l o create a market for stockholders desiring to s e l l their stock of the Company who have been unable to do so in the past because of lack of marketability.
(2) To reduce the cost of communication to stockholders.
(3) To make shares of the Company and Insurance Investment Company available for employee benefit programs.
(4) To make shares of the Company and Insurance Investment Company available for use in the acquisition of other companies.
(5) To increase the percentage of ownership of Insurance Investment Company in the Company. Such an increase would permit Insurance Investment Company to qualify
for the 100 percent dividend exclusion for federal income tax purposes and/or e n t i t l e Insurance Investment Company to f i l e a consolidated return with the Company.
(6) To eliminate the Company's appearance as a potential candidate for an outside takeover. The Company's publicly held stock gave the appearance to uninformed
individuals that i t was possible to purchase control of the Company by offering to purchase the Company's publicly held stock. Although i t was believed that such
attempts were f u t i l e , such attempts were nevertheless being made, and were extremely disruptive and detrimental to the operation of the Company.
On November 17, 1966, the Company i n i t i a t e d the above purchase plan by s o l i c i t i n g from i t s shareholders offers to sell to the Company up to 115,500 shares of i t s outstanding
$1.00 par value common shares for $22.50 per share. The Company acquired 95.662.43 common shares under the s o l i c i t a t i o n and subsequent purchases for an aggregate cash
consideration of $2,152,404.
On October 31, 1967, the Company entered into an agreement with a coa.lition of some of i t s remaining shareholders wherein the Company agreed to purchase 44,544.37 shares of
i t s common stock, 25,050.66 preferred shares of Insurance Investment Company, 11,602.23 common shares of Insurance Investment Company and 9.793.10 common shares of National Housing,
related corporation, for $1,450,000 cash and the issuance of 363,000 shares of the Company's newly authorized $2.00 par value preferred stock. The Company was required to purchase
a l l of this various stock in order to purchase any of i t .
Effective April 15, 1966, National Mousing was merged into the Company. As a result of the merger, the Company acquired 7,366.65 shares of i t s common stock, 4,315 preferred
share* of Insurance Investment Company and $662,095 in net a s s e t s , based upon their appraised fair value. In consideration for which, the Company paid $150,000 cash and issued
40,000 shares of the Company's preferred stock.
The total consideration paid by the Company under the above acquisitions is comprised of $3,752,404 cash and 403,000 shares of $2.00 par value preferred stock with an assigned
cost of $9,229 ptr share (the einimum redemption p r i c e ) . Since $662,095 of nonstock assets were received in tht lUtional Housing Ntrger, the total assigned cost for the treasury
stock acquired is $6,609,596 ($3,752,404 cash • $3,719,267 (assigned value of preferred stock) — $662,095 (net value of nonstock assets acquired)). The aggregate consideration
of $6,609,596 has beer, assigned to the cost of common treasury stock attributable to the above transaction for financial reporting purposes. During 1966. the Company redeemed
36,603.35 shares of i t s preferred stock at an avenge cost of $10.71 per share.
Tht owners of the preferred stock may, in the future, i f the Company has sufficient earnings in tht prior year, cause tht Company to purchase up to 40.300 shares per year at a
price of $10.72 per share plus (or minus) a percentage of earnings (or losses) presented on line 31 of the Company's Annual Statement. Although the Company does not know whether
or not this right will be exercised, tht Company will record a l i a b i l i t y as a write—in iten appearing or. page 3 of i t s Annutl Statement identifying i t s potential l i a b i l i t y for the
subsequent ytar's purchast. This procedure of recording this l i a b i l i t y his been reviewed and approved by tht Utah Department of Usuranct.
Tht Company's holding of treasury shares consists of 147.573.06 shares of i t s common stock which are owned directly by the Company and 153,036.26 shares which are held
indirectly through tht Company's 40.3 percent holding (41,167.69 shares) of i t s parent company's capital shares (based on liquidation r i g h t s . Doth the directly and indirectly
held shares are d*f-n*4 to be treasury stock by tht Company for financial reporting purposes. The Company is holding such shares as treasury stock to satisfy the previously mentioned
purposes.
Tht Cocpany has received accounting assistance fron Feat Karwick Kain a\ Co. and legal assistance Iron Fabian I Clendenin in recording these transactions.
D. Tht Company has no guaranties or undertakings for tht benefit of an a f f i l i a t e which might result in a material contingent exposure of the Company's or a f f i l i a t e d insurer's
assets to l i a b i l i t y .
E. The Company does not have any management or service contracts of insuring arrangements with any a f f i l i a t e d insurer.

ERA£D C0HPEKSAT10K AhD RnjfcEXEKT PLANS
A. The Company has an employee profit sharing plan and a Section 403(k) plan for the employees. The Company has no retirement plan for i t s agents. The Company's Board of
Directors determines annually the amount of contributions, i f any, tht Company will make to tht profit sharing plan. Contributions to the S40i(k) plan are made solely by employee
elected contributions. Each of tht plans are fully funded. The Company has no l i a b i l i t y for benefits under either of the retirer.«ent plans.

R i c h f i e l d , Utah
J u l y 2 9 , 1991
Lynn P . Heward
928 HjflSt 5375 S o . //E

Salt Lake City, Utah 8)|.117
Dear Mr, Reward,
We received your letter concerning share of stock in IIC.
We eve leaving for CA in a ma tter of minutes. We !11 be there
a couple of weeks and then return to Utah. As us ual we donft
understand too well just what the case is and jus t what it
would mean to us. It looks a s though funds that might be fourth
coming might be used up in fe es and such leaving us with about
what we have or less. We fee 1 that when Attorneys and the IRS
get though with money we rece ive we just as well have not received it. That is of course if there is any funds to receive,
It may be of interest to us if it looked lik e there would
be any thine; for us.

Sincere

*• & &£cJ72£U
R. Chad Peterson

Mr. & Mrs. R. Chad Peterson
712N.Crestview0r.
RlchfieW,UT 84701

INSURANCE INVESTMENT COMPANY
BALANCE SHEET
December 31, 1988

ASSETS:
Checking

(4

Savings Accounts

1,403
144,334

Stock

145,733
LIABILITIES;
Notes Payable

1,777

EQUITY;
Common Stock

25,000

Preferred Stock

77,177

Paid in Surplus

40,179

Earned Surplus
1988 Operations

2,934.68
(1,335.37)

1,599
145,7

INSURANCE INVESTMENT COMPANY
STATEMENT OF PROFIT & LOSS
YEAR - 1988

INCOME:
132. .53

Interest Income

28, .00

Tax refund (State)

103. .00

Tax refund (Federal)

263.53
EXPENSES:
State Corporation Fees
Income Tax (State)

15.00
100.00

Banking Expense

29.27

C.P.A. Expense

989.63

Interest Expense

465.00
1,598.90

